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Luyao Niu, Jie Fu and Andrew Clark
Abstract—Cyber-physical systems are conducting increas-
ingly complex tasks, which are often modeled using formal
languages such as temporal logic. The system’s ability to
perform the required tasks can be curtailed by malicious
adversaries that mount intelligent attacks. At present, however,
synthesis in the presence of such attacks has received limited
research attention. In particular, the problem of synthesizing a
controller when the required specifications cannot be satisfied
completely due to adversarial attacks has not been studied.
In this paper, we focus on the minimum violation control
synthesis problem under linear temporal logic constraints of
a stochastic finite state discrete-time system with the presence
of an adversary. A minimum violation control strategy is one
that satisfies the most important tasks defined by the user while
violating the less important ones. We model the interaction
between the controller and adversary using a concurrent Stack-
elberg game and present a nonlinear programming problem to
formulate and solve for the optimal control policy. To reduce
the computation effort, we develop a heuristic algorithm that
solves the problem efficiently and demonstrate our proposed
approach using a numerical case study.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-physical systems have been identified to play im-
portant roles in multiple application domains such as health
care systems, cloud computing, and smart homes. To model
the increasingly complex tasks and corresponding desired
system behaviors consistently, rigorously and compactly,
temporal logics such as linear temporal logic (LTL) and
computation tree logic (CTL) are adopted in recent literature.
Typical system properties that can be modeled using LTL,
whose syntax and semantics have been well developed,
include liveness (e.g., ‘always eventually A’), reactivity (e.g.,
‘if A, then B’), safety (e.g., ‘always not A’) and so on.
Formal methods provide a class of theory and methods
for controller design to satisfy given specifications modeled
using temporal logics. Such control synthesis problems have
been investigated in different applications such as robotic
motion planning [1], [2] and optimal control [3], [4]. How-
ever, these works normally explicitly or implicitly assume
the existence of the controller, which is not always the case.
In [5], unsynthesizable controllers are characterized as
either unsatisfiability or unrealizability. Unsatisfiability is
caused by the incompatibility of the specifications given
to the system, while unrealizability is caused by uncertain-
ties and stochastic errors. Different from uncertainties and
stochastic errors, malicious attacks can also cause unsyn-
thesizable controllers in CPS. Malicious attacks on CPS
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raise the concern on CPS security since they can lead to
misbehaviors and failures. For instance, power outage caused
by attackers on power system [6], a false data injection
(FDI) based attack CarShark on automobiles [7] and widely
known Stuxnet on industrial control system (ICS) all caused
significant economic losses and/or safety risks.
The approaches proposed for analyzing uncertainties and
stochastic errors are not applicable for analyzing malicious
attacks on CPS. Moreover, uncertainties and stochastic errors
are often viewed as identically and independently distributed
random variables, which is not the case for malicious and
strategic attacks. In the worst case, stochastic elements such
as environment behavior are interpreted as malicious attacks
on the system. Zero-sum game provides a good model
for worst case analysis [8]. Meanwhile, failures returned
by control synthesis framework could also be caused by
malicious and strategic attacks such as jamming attack and
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack which are subject to different
information pattern comparing to zero-sum game. In security
domain, Stackelberg game is a more reasonable model [9],
[10], where player 1 (always denoted as leader in the game)
commits to its strategy first and player 2 (always denoted
as follower in the game) observes leader’s strategy and then
plays its best response. Stackelberg game can capture the
information asymmetry and model the value of information.
In this paper, we consider a stochastic discrete-time system
with the presence of an adversary, which is abstracted as
a stochastic game (SG). The system is given a set of
specifications modeled in LTL co-safe (scLTL). We focus
on the scenario where no controller can be synthesized
to satisfy the specifications simultaneously due to either
incompatibility between specifications or the presence of the
adversary. Thus we aim at the minimum violation control
strategy synthesis problem, i.e., compute a control strategy
that violates the less important specifications and satisfies
the most important specifications based on user’s preference
[11]. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to
analyze minimum violation control synthesis on stochastic
system in the presence of adversary. To summarize, we
make the following contributions. We formulate a stochastic
game to model the interaction between the controller and
adversary. We give examples for typical attacks in CPS that
can be incorporated into our proposed framework. To model
limited observation capability of human adversary, anchoring
bias is considered. We present the completion procedure to
augment each automaton associated with each specification
given to the system. We calculate the product SG using
the completed automaton and SG. We formulate a nonlinear
programming problem on the product SG to calculate the
optimal control policy. A heuristic algorithm is proposed to
compute an approximate solution. The proposed algorithm
significantly saves computation cost and memory cost. The
convergence of the algorithm is proved. A numerical case
study is used to demonstrate the proposed approach. By using
the proposed approach, more specifications can be satisfied
when considering the presence of the adversary. Finally,
we show the relationship between the controller’s expected
utility and the anchoring bias parameter of adversary.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Related work is presented in Section II and preliminary
backgrounds are presented in Section III. Section IV presents
problem formulation. We give solution method in Section V.
A numerical case study is given in Section VI. We conclude
this paper in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Control synthesis under temporal logic constraints nor-
mally assumes the specifications can be satisfied. Contribu-
tions on the cases when the specifications cannot be fulfilled
can be classified into four categories. First, the minimum
violation problem for deterministic system has been stud-
ied in [11]–[14]. Violations caused by confliction between
specifications have been studied in [11]–[13], and a control
strategy that satisfies the most important specifications is
synthesized. In [14], a two-player concurrent Stackelberg
differential game is formulated. Quantitative preference over
satisfactions of scLTL is investigated in [15]. However,
contributions [11]–[15] focus on deterministic systems and
hence the proposed approaches are not applicable to stochas-
tic systems. Second, unsynthesizable specifications are an-
alyzed in [5]. Third, model repair problem is investigated
so that satisfaction on specifications is guaranteed [16],
[17]. Finally, specification revision problem is investigated
in [18]. Planning revision under temporal logic specification
is investigated in [19]. However, none of the aforementioned
papers consider the presence of adversary. Furthermore, non-
deterministic automata are used in the aforementioned papers
while deterministic automata are used in this paper.
Secure control in adversarial environment has been inves-
tigated using both control theoretic based approach [20] and
game theoretic methods [10], [21]. When game theory meets
temporal logic, turn-based two-player SG has been used to
construct model checker [22] and model checking framework
[23], [24]. The difference is that a general sum concurrent SG
is considered in this paper. Secure control under LTL formula
specification modeling liveness and safety constraints is
considered in [25]. The proposed approach in [25] focuses
on liveness and safety constraints, while this paper considers
specifications modeled using scLTL.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we present backgrounds on linear temporal
logic and stochastic games.
A. Linear Temporal Logic (LTL)
An LTL formula consists of a set of atomic propositions
Π, boolean operators including negation (¬), conjunction
(∧) and disjunction (∨) and temporal operators including
next (X) and until (U) [26]. An LTL formula is defined
inductively as
φ = True | π | ¬φ | φ1 ∧ φ2 | Xφ | φ1 U φ2.
Other operators such as implication ( =⇒ ), eventually (F )
and always (G) can be defined using operators above. In
particular, φ =⇒ ψ is equivalent to ¬φ∨ψ, Fφ is equivalent
to True U φ, and Gφ is equivalent to ¬F¬φ.
The semantics of LTL formulas are defined over infinite
words in 2Π. Informally speaking, Gφ is true if and only if
φ is true for the current time step and all future time. Fφ
is true if and only if φ is true at some future time. Xφ is
true if and only if φ is true in the next time step. A word η
satisfying an LTL formula φ is denoted as η |= φ.
In this paper, we focus on syntactically co-safe LTL
(scLTL) formulas.
Definition 1. (scLTL [27]): Any string that satisfies a scLTL
formula consists of a finite string (a good prefix) followed by
any infinite continuation. This continuation does not affect
the formula’s truth value.
By Definition 1, a word η satisfies an scLTL for-
mula φ if it contains a good prefix η0η1 · · · ηn such that
η0η1 · · · ηnηn+1ηn+2 · · · |= φ for any suffix ηn+1ηn+2 · · · .
For each scLTL formula, a deterministic finite automaton
(DFA) can be obtained. A DFA is defined as follows.
Definition 2. (Deterministic finite automaton): A DFA A is
a tuple A = (Q, q0,Σ, δ, F ), where Q is a finite set of states,
q0 ∈ Q is the initial state, Σ is alphabet, δ : Q × Σ → Q
is the set of transitions and F ⊆ Q is the set of accepting
states.
A run on a DFA A over a finite input word σ =
σ0σ1 · · ·σn is a sequence of states Q
∗ = q0q1 · · · qn such
that δ(qk−1, σk) = qk for all 0 ≤ k ≤ n. A run is accepting
if qn ∈ F . The satisfaction of a formula φ by a run σ is
denoted as σ |= φ. To enable violations on specifications,
we assume any DFA A is complete, i.e., for any q ∈ Q
and σ ∈ Σ, δ(q, σ) is defined. The completion procedure
can be achieved by adding an additional sink state and let
δ(q, σ) = sink if δ(q, σ) is undefined.
B. Stochastic Game (SG)
A Stochastic Game (SG) is defined as follows.
Definition 3. (Stochastic Game): A stochastic game G is a
tuple G = (S,UC , UA, P r,Π,L), where S is a finite set of
states, UC is a set of actions of the controller, UA is a set of
actions of an adversary, Pr : S×UC×UA×S → [0, 1] is a
transition function where Pr(s, uC , uA, s
′) is the probability
of a transition from state s to state s′ when the controller
takes action uC and the adversary takes action uA. Π is a
set of atomic propositions. L : S → 2Π is a labeling function
mapping each state to a subset of propositions in Π.
Denote the admissible actions as the set of actions avail-
able to the controller (resp. adversary) at each state s ∈ S
as UC(s) (resp. UA(s)). A finite (resp. infinite) path on SG
G is a finite (resp. infinite) sequence of states denoted as
Pathfin = s0s1 · · · sn(resp. Pathinf = s0s1s2 · · · ). Let
Path be the set of finite paths. A control policy µ : Path×
UC → R (resp. adversary policy λ : Path× UA → R) is a
function specifying the probability distribution over control
(resp. attack) actions given historical trajectory Pathfin. An
admissible policy is the policy whose support is the set of
admissible actions at each state. In particular, we consider
a memoryless control(resp. adversary) policy in this paper,
i.e., µ (resp. λ) depends only on the current state.
Stackelberg SG is a widely adopted model in security
domain [9]. In the Stackelberg setting, one player is the
leader and another player is the follower. The leader first
commits to a strategy µ. The follower then observes the
strategy µ and play its best response λ. Given any control
policy µ, the best response from the adversary is represented
as BR(µ) = {λ|λ = argmaxλ TA(µ, λ)}, where TA(µ, λ)
is the adversary’s utility given a pair of leader-follower
strategies. The Stackelberg equilibrium is defined as follows.
Definition 4. (Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE)): Denote the
utility that the leader (resp. follower) gains in a stochas-
tic game G under leader follower strategy pair (µ, λ) as
TC(µ, τ) (resp. TA(µ, τ)). A pair of leader follower strategy
(µ, λ) is an SE if leader’s strategy µ is optimal given that
the follower observes its strategy and plays its best response,
i.e., µ ∈ argmaxµ′∈µ TC(µ′,BR(µ′)), where µ is the set
of all admissible policies of the controller and λ ∈ BR(µ′)
denotes the best response to the leader’s strategy µ′ from the
follower.
In Stackelberg games with human adversaries, anchoring
bias is used to model the confidence of the adversary in
its observations on µ [28]. When considering anchoring
bias, the response λ might not be the best response to
control policy µ. Human adversaries normally assign uniform
probability to the control action at each state [28]. When
more information is obtained via observation, adversaries
slowly update the distributions. In this paper a linear model
is adopted to represent the estimated probability. In this
model, the estimated probability of human adversary that
the controller takes action uC at each state is calculated as
µ˜(s, uC) = α
1
|UC(s)|
+ (1 − α)µ(s, uC), ∀s, uC (1)
where α ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter to tune the balance between
the original and true probability. When α = 0, the estimated
probability becomes the true probability and thus the adver-
sary plays its best response. When α = 1, then the estimated
probability becomes the uniform distribution, implying the
adversary has no capability to observe or infer the control
policy based on his observation.
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we first present the problem formulation.
Then we show that several typical CPS security problems
can be analyzed using the proposed framework. We con-
sider a finite-state discrete-time system in the presence of
an adversary, which can be abstracted using a SG G0 =
(S,UC , UA, P r,Π,L) as defined in Definition 3.
We adopt the concurrent Stackelberg setting. In particular,
the controller acts as the leader and the adversary is the
follower. The controller first commits to its strategy (or
control policy) µ. Then the adversary, who observes the
historical behavior of the controller, plays its response λ
to the control policy µ. We assume that both the controller
and adversary can observe current state s. At each system
state s, both the controller and adversary have to take actions
simultaneously and the system evolves to state s′ following
transition function defined in Definition 3.
The system is assigned a set of specifications Φ =
{φ1, φ2, · · · , φn} modeled using scLTL [12], [13]. By sat-
isfying each specification φi ∈ Φ, the controller gains a
reward r(φi). The objective of the controller is to maximize
the total reward obtained via satisfying specifications. In the
worst case, the adversary attempts to deviate system behavior
and drive the system to violate specifications in Φ so as to
minimize the total reward obtained by system. Hence, the
specifications cannot be satisfied simultaneously due to either
incompatibility of specifications or the presence of adversary.
Thus we investigate the minimum violation problem on such
a system as follows.
Problem 1. Given an SG G0 abstracted from the system
in the presence of an adversary and a set of specifications
Φ = {φ1, · · · , φn} that potentially cannot be satisfied by
system simultaneously, with each φi ∈ Φ associated with
a reward function r(φi), compute a control policy µ such
that µ and the best response from adversary λ ∈ BR(µ˜)
constitutes SE defined in Definition 4.
In the following, we show several problems in security
domain can be formulated using our proposed framework.
1) Patrolling Security Game with single type of adversary
[29]: The states S are set as locations in PSG. The actions
UC and UA are the actions available to the patrol unit
and adversary, respectively. In particular, UC includes the
actions that transit the patrol unit among the locations, while
UA are the intrusion actions modeling which location is
targeted by the adversary. The transition probability captures
the transition uncertainty. The actions taken by both players
jointly determine their utilities. For instance, the adversary
wins if the target region is under attack without protection
and the patrol unit wins otherwise.
The interaction between the patrol unit and adversary is
modeled as a Stackelberg game. The security force is the
leader while the adversary is the follower. The adversary can
observe the schedule of security force (by waiting outside the
environment indefinitely) and play its best response.
By using our proposed framework, task dependent rewards
can be defined and thus more complex behaviors of the
patrolling unit can be considered. For example, the patrolling
unit can be given the following tasks: visit areas in sequence
(e.g., ‘First region A then region B then region C’: F (A ∧
(F B∧F C))) and reactivity (e.g., ‘if some passenger enters
prohibited region, stop them’: prohibited =⇒ stop).
2) Jamming Attacks on CPS: Applications such as
SCADA networks and remotely controlled UAVs can be
modeled as CPS where the controller communicates with the
plant via a wireless network corrupted by a strategic jamming
attacker.
Let the state of the plant evolves following a finite state
discrete-time dynamics x(k + 1) = Ax(k) + Bu(k) +
ω(k), k = 0, 1 · · · , where x(k) is the system state,
u(k) = Γ(uC(k), uA(k)) is the system input jointly
determined by the control signal uC(k) and adversary
signal uA(k) for all k and ω(k) is stochastic distur-
bance. Function Γ(uC(k), uA(k)) can be formulated as: (i)
Γ(uC(k), uA(k)) = uA(k) · uC(k), uA(k) ∈ {0, 1}, ∀k
[30], or (ii) Γ(uC(k), uA(k)) = uA(k) + uC(k), ∀k [31].
The formulation of (i) models scenario where the adversary
can cause collision at the receiver equipped on the plant and
result in denial-of service (DoS) attack. The formulation in
(ii) models the scenario where the adversary can flip several
bits in the packet and result in false information at the
plant. Note that when the adversary launches DoS attack,
the actuator can generate no input for the plant as u(k) = 0
when uA(k) = 0 [30], or u(k) = u(k−1) when uA(k) = 0.
Consider the example of an autonomous UAV. The
reachability specification can be given to the UAV as
‘eventually reach target region and avoid obstacles’, i.e,
G¬ obstacle ∧ F target.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION FOR PROBLEM 1
In this section, we first present a mixed integer non-
linear programming (MINLP) formulation. Then we propose
a heuristic solution to compute a proper stationary control
policy, which will be defined later.
For each specification φi, a complete DFA Ai =
(Qi, qi0,Σ, δ
i, F i) can be constructed. Given the set of com-
plete automata A = {A1, · · · ,An} with each Ai associated
with φi, we can construct a product automaton using the
following definition [26].
Definition 5. (Product automaton): A product
automaton obtained from A is a tuple AP =
(QP , q0,P ,Σ, δP , FP ), where QP = Q
1 × · · · × Qn
is a finite set of states, q0,P = (q
1
0 , · · · , q
n
0 ) is the
initial state, Σ is the alphabet inherited from A,
δP =
(
(q1, · · · , qn), σ, (q1
′
, · · · , qn′)
)
if δi(qi, σ) = qi
′
for
all i} and FP =
{
(q1, · · · , qn)|qi ∈ F i, ∀i
}
is the set of
accepting states.
Given the SG G0 and product automaton AP , we can
construct a product SG G defined as follows.
Definition 6. (Product SG): Given SG G0 =
(S,UC , UA, P r,L,Π) and product automaton
AP = (QP , q0,P ,Σ, δP , FP), a (weighted and labeled)
product SG is a tuple G = (SP , UC , UA, P rP , Acc,W ),
where SP = S × QP is a finite set of states, UC
(resp. UA) is a finite set of control inputs (resp. attack
signals), PrP((s, q
1, · · · , qn), uC , uA, (s′, q1
′
, · · · , qn′)) =
Pr(s, uC , uA, s
′) if ((q1, · · · , qn),L(s′), (q1
′
, · · · , qn′)) ∈
δP , Acc = S × FP , and W is a weight function assigning
each transition a reward.
The weight function of product SG G is defined as
W ((s, q1, · · · , qn), uC , uA, (s
′, q1
′
, · · · , qn′)) =
n∑
i=1
Iii′r(φi),
(2)
where the indicator Iii′ = 1 if q
i /∈ F i and qi
′
∈ F i
and Iii′ = 0 otherwise. By the definition (2), we have that
a trace τ collects reward by satisfying specifications if a
specification is satisfied at first time. We index the states in
the product SG G as sP .
A proper control policy on product SG is defined as
follows.
Definition 7. (Proper Policies): A stationary control policy
µ is proper if under µ, regardless of the policy chosen by
the adversary, the set of destination states can eventually be
reached with positive probability, where a destination state
sP = (s, q
1, · · · , qn) is a state such that qi is an absorbing
state in automaton Ai for all i.
If a control policy µ′ is improper, then under policy µ′,
there exists some state sP that has zero probability to reach
the set of destination states.
A. MINLP Formulation
For the controller’s strategy, since randomized stationary
strategies are considered in Problem 1, we have that
µ(sP , uC) ≥ 0, ∀sP ∈ SP , uC ∈ UC , (3)∑
uC∈UC(sP)
µ(sP , uC) = 1, ∀sP ∈ SP , (4)
λ(sP , uA) ∈ {0, 1}, ∀sP ∈ SP , uA ∈ UA, (5)∑
uA∈UA(sP )
λ(sP , uA) = 1, ∀sP ∈ SP , (6)
where (4) and (6) guarantees that the probability distribution
sums to one. Eq. (5) holds since in Stackelberg games, it is
sufficient to consider pure strategies for the follower [32].
The value function for the controller VC(sP) (resp. ad-
versary VA(sP)) is defined as the expected reward for the
controller (resp. adversary) starting from state sP . The value
functions can be characterized using the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The expected reward of the controller and ad-
versary induced by policy µ and λ can be represented as
VC(sP ) =
∑
uC∈UC
[
µ(sP , uC)
∑
uA∈UA
λ(sP , uA)
∑
s′
P
PrP(sP , uC , uA, s
′
P)(W (sP , uC , uA, s
′
P) + VC(s
′
P))
]
,
VA(sP) =
∑
uC∈UC
[
µ˜(sP , uC)
∑
uA∈UA
λ(sP , uA)
∑
s′
P
PrP(sP , uC , uA, s
′
P)(−W (sP , uC , uA, s
′
P) + VA(s
′
P))
]
.
Moreover, given a pair of policies µ and λ, the expected
reward of the controller and adversary are the unique
solutions to the linear equations above.
Proof. The expected reward starting from state sP is calcu-
lated as
W˜ (sP) =
∑
uC∈UC
µ(sP , uC)
∑
uA∈UA
λ(sP , uA)
∑
s′
P
PrP (sP , uC , uA, s
′
P)W (sP , uC , uA, s
′
P).
Given a pair of policies µ and λ, the stochastic game
reduces to a Markov chain. The expected reward VC(sP )
is then viewed as the expected reward collected by the
path starting from sP to the set of destination states, which
is equivalent to the shortest path problem on the induced
Markov chain. By the dynamic programming algorithm of
stochastic shortest path problem on Markov chain, we have
[33]
VC(sP ) = W˜ (sP )
+
∑
s′
P
PrP(sP , uC , uA, s
′
P)VC(s
′
P). (7)
Then by the definition of W˜ , we have that Lemma 1 holds.
Based on Lemma 1, we have the following proposition
which gives the sufficiency of considering proper policies.
Proposition 1. If a proper control policy µ′ is associated
with the highest expected reward for the controller among all
proper policies, then it associates with the highest expected
reward among all stationary policies.
Proof. Let µ be the control policy that enables the controller
receiving highest reward among all stationary policies. If µ
is a proper policy, then the result clearly holds. Next, we
focus on the scenario where µ is improper and show that by
construction, we have a proper control policy µ′ such that
the expected rewards for the controller under policy µ and
µ′ are equal. Divide the set of states SP into two subsets S1
and S2. In particular, let S1 be the set of states that cannot
reach the set of destination states, while S2 denotes the set
of states that reach the set of destination states with positive
probability. Let µ′ = µ for all sP ∈ S2. By hypothesis on
µ, we have that the proper control policy µ′ corresponds to
the highest expected reward when the initial state is in S2.
By the assumption on the existence of a proper policy µ˜, we
let µ′ = µ˜ for all sP ∈ S1. Since µ is an improper policy
while µ˜ is a proper policy, we have that the expected reward
received by the controller by committing to control policy
µ′ is no less than committing to µ. Hence, we have a proper
control policy µ′ such that the controller receives expected
reward no less than committing to improper policy µ.
By Proposition 1, we can restrict the search space of
control policy to the set of proper control policies. Denote the
expected reward obtained by the controller starting from state
sP when the controller commits to strategy µ and adversary
takes action uA as BC(sP , µ, uA). Define BA(sP , µ˜, uA) for
the adversary analogously. Then for all sP ∈ SP , uA ∈ UA,
the expected reward for the controller (resp. adversary) can
be represented as
BC(sP , µ, uA) =
∑
uC∈UC
µ(sP , uC)
[∑
s′
P
PrP(sP , uC , uA, s
′
P)
(W (sP , uC , uA, s
′
P) + VC(s
′
P))
]
, (8)
BA(sP , µ˜, uA) =
∑
uC∈UC
µ˜(sP , uC)
[∑
s′
P
PrP (sP , uC , uA, s
′
P)
(−W (sP , uC , uA, s
′
P) + VA(s
′
P))
]
, (9)
which are the expected utility of the controller and adver-
sary, respectively. Note that the adversary’s expected reward
depends on its observation over the control policy µ˜ defined
in (1). Since λ is binary, we can bound the values for
the adversary and controller using the big M method [32],
respectively, for all sP and uA as follows:
BA(sP , µ˜, uA) ≤ VA(sP) ≤ BA(sP , µ˜, uA)
+ (1− λ(sP , uA))Z, (10)
VC(sP) ≤ BC(sP , µ, uA) + (1− λ(sP , uA))Z, (11)
where Z is a sufficiently large positive number. Inequality
(10) and (11) give bounds for VA(sP) and VC(sP ). De-
pending on the value of λ, the upper bounds for VC(sP )
(resp. VA(sP)) can be either infinity (λ(sP , uA) = 1) or
BC(sP , µ, uA) (resp. BA(sP , µ, uA)).
To compute the control policy that maximizes the expected
utility of controller, the following optimization problem can
be formulated [32].
max
µ,λ,VC ,VA
γTVC (12)
s.t. (1) (3) (4) (5) (6) (10) and (11)
where γ is the initial distribution over state space SP . Since
constraints (10) and (11) introduce nonlinearity and λ is
binary, the optimization problem (12) is an MINLP.
B. Heuristic Solution
The MINLP (12) is nonconvex and solving it is NP-hard.
In the following, we present a value iteration based heuristic
solution to the MINLP (12).
As shown in Algorithm 1, we first initialize an arbitrary
set of initial policies using sampling approach, where the
sample space is the product of |SP | probability simplices in
R
|UC |. Then by solving the optimal control problem from the
perspective of adversary on the MDP induced by each control
policy [1]–[4], we can solve for a set of expected rewards for
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for computing a control strategy µ
that maximizes the expected reward VC .
1: Let H ← {VC,1, · · · , VC,t, · · · , VC,|H|}, V ← ∅,
2: for VC,t ∈ H do
3: k ← 0
4: repeat
5: Solve MILP (13) to obtain expected reward V kC .
6: k ← k + 1
7: until γTV kC − γ
TV k−1C ≤ ǫ or MILP (13) is infeasi-
ble.
8: if γTV kC − γ
TV k−1C ≤ ǫ then
9: V ← V ∪ {γTV kC}
10: end if
11: end for
12: if V = ∅ then
13: Return to step 2
14: else
15: t∗ ← argmax{VC,t : t = 1, 2, · · · , |H|}
16: µ← policy obtained from VC,t∗
17: return µ
18: end if
the controller H = {VC,1, · · · , VC,t, · · · , VC,|H|} associated
with the initial policies.
For each initial expected reward VC,t ∈ H, value iteration
(line 3 to line 7) is used to find a control policy such that the
objective function γTVC is maximized. In particular, at itera-
tion k+1, given the expected reward obtained from previous
iteration V kC , the following mixed integer linear programming
(MILP) is solved to calculate the proper control policy µk+1.
max
µ,λ,VC ,VA
γTVC (13)
s.t. VC(sP ) ≤ B
k
C(sP , µ, uA)
+ (1− λ(sP , uA)Z, ∀sP , uA
BkA(sP , µ, uA) ≤ VA(sP )
≤ BkA(sP , µ, uA) + (1 − λ(sP , uA)Z, ∀sP , uA
(1) (3) (4) (5) (6)
where BkC(sP , µ, uA) and B
k
A(sP , µ, uA) are obtained by
(8) and (9) using V kC (sP) and V
k
A (sP), respectively. Note
that when solving the MILP (13), the policy chosen by
the adversary is the best response to µ˜k obtained from (1).
The algorithm terminates when either V kC − V
k−1
C ≤ ǫ or
the MILP (13) is infeasible. The first termination condition
focuses on the scenario where an optimal VC can be found by
solving the optimization problem. Since the initial guess is
given arbitrarily while VC is bounded within [0,
∑
φ∈Φ r(φ)],
thus MILP (13) might be infeasible. In this case, such an
initial guess should be skipped and the value iteration module
terminates. After a feasible VC is found at some iteration t,
we store VC in vector V . Then the control policy returned
by Algorithm 1 is the control policy corresponding to the
maximum value in V .
The convergence of Algorithm 1 is presented in the
following theorem.
Theorem 1. Algorithm 1 converges in finite time.
Before presenting the proof of Theorem 1, we first in-
troduce two operators denoted as Tµ : R
|SP | → R|SP | and
T : R|SP | → R|SP | as follows:
TµVC(sP ) = min
λ∈BR(µ˜)
∑
uC∈UC
µ(sP , uC)
∑
uA∈UA
λ(sP , uA)
∑
s′
P
[
PrP (sP , uC , uA, s
′
P)(W (sP , uC , uA, s
′
P) + VC(s
′
P))
]
,
(14)
TVC(sP ) = max
µ
min
λ∈BR(µ˜)
∑
uC∈UC
µ(sP , uC)
∑
uA∈UA
λ(sP , uA)
∑
s′
P
[
PrP (sP , uC , uA, s
′
P)(W (sP , uC , uA, s
′
P) + VC(s
′
P))
]
,
(15)
The following lemmas characterizes the operator Tµ.
Lemma 2. For any vectors V and V ′ such that V ≤ V ′,
we have T kµV ≤ T
k
µV
′ for all policies µ and k, where T kµ (·)
iteratively applying Tµ operator k times.
Proof. By definition (14) and (15), we can view the oper-
ator T kµ as the total expected reward collected from a k-
stage problem with cost per stage W˜ k(sP ). Increasing V
is equivalent to increasing the terminal reward (e.g., the
reward collected when reaching the destination) in the k-
stage problem. Since cost per stage is fixed, hence increasing
V will increase the expected total reward in the k-stage
problem, which implies monotonicity of T kµ .
We omit the proof for Lemma 2 due to space limit.
Lemma 3. Denote the expected reward induced by proper
control policy µ and adversary policy λ ∈ BR(µ˜) as V µ,λC .
Then V µ,λC satisfies limM→∞(T
M
µ VC) = V
µ,λ
C .
Proof. Since we focus on stationary policies, then by induct-
ing Lemma 1, TMµ VC can be represented as
TMµ VC = Pr
MVC +
M−1∑
m=0
PrmW˜ , (16)
where Pr is the transition matrix of the Markov chain
induced by control policy µ and adversary policy λ. Since
the control policy µ is proper, we can eventually reach the
set of destination states with probability 1. By definition (2),
no reward can be collected when starting from destination
states. Therefore, we have limM→∞ Pr
MVC = 0. Then, by
taking limit on both sides of (16) as M tends to infinity, we
have limm→∞ T
M
µ VC = limM→∞
∑M−1
m=0 Pr
mW˜ . By the
definition of V µ,λC , we have limM→∞(T
M
µ VC) = V
µ,λ
C , and
hence Lemma 3 is proved.
Finally, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2. The optimal expected total reward for the
controller at each iteration k satisfies V kC = TV
k−1
C .
Proof. Suppose the expected reward for the controller is V¯ kC
at some iteration k such that V¯ kC 6= TV
k−1
C . If V¯
k
C > TV
k−1
C ,
we have that V¯ kC is not a feasible solution to MILP (13).
If V¯ kC < TV
k−1
C , then starting from V¯
k
C , we can always
search along some direction in the feasible region of (13)
until we reach the boundary of the feasible region to find
some Vˆ kC ≥ V¯
k
C . Hence, V¯
k
C is not the optimal solution to
(13). Therefore, we have V kC = TV
k−1
C holds.
In the following, we present the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof. (Proof of Theorem 1.) We show that Algorithm 1
terminates within finite iterations because both outer and
inner loops terminate within finite iterations.
First, the outer loop executes exactly |H| times and thus
the outer loop terminates within finite iterations.
Next, we show at each outer loop iteration t, the
value iteration module converges within finite time. It is
obvious that the inner loop terminates when the initial
guess on VC is not feasible. In the following we focus
on the feasible case. Let k be the iteration index of value
iteration (line 3 to line 7). Let us denote the expected
reward of the controller induced by control policy µk
and adversary policy λk ∈ BR(µ˜k) at each iteration
k as V kC . Let the expected reward of each transition
starting from state sP and the transition matrix under
control policy µk and adversary policy λk be W˜ k(sP ) =∑
uC
∑
uA
∑
s′
P
µk(sP , uC)λ
k(sP , uA)W (sP , uC , uA, s
′
P)
and Prk(sP , s
′
P) =
∑
uC
µk(sP , uC)
∑
uA
λk(sP , uA)
Pr(sP , uC , uA, s
′
P), respectively. By Lemma 1 and
Proposition 2, we observe that V k+1C = TV
k
C is equivalent
to find a control policy µk+1 such that Tµk+1V
k
C = TV
k
C .
Therefore V kC = TµkV
k
C = W˜
k + PrkV kC ≤
W˜ k+1 + Prk+1V kC = Tµk+1V
k
C , where the inequality
holds by definition (14) and (15), i.e., TµkV
k
C ≤ TV
k
C .
View V kC as T
0
µk+1
V kC . Then composing Tµk+1 m times and
taking the limit as m→∞, by Lemma 2, we can construct
a sequence of inequalities V kC ≤ Tµk+1V
k
C , Tµk+1V
k
C ≤
T 2
µk+1
V kC , · · · , T
m−1
µk+1
V kC ≤ T
m
µk+1
V kC . Therefore, we have
V kC ≤ limm→∞ T
m
µk+1
V kC = V
k+1
C , where the convergence
of Tmµ follows from Lemma 3. Hence, the expected reward
increases with respect to the number of iterations k. Since
VC is upper bounded by
∑
φ∈Φ r(φ), we claim that the
value iteration module converges within finite time.
Furthermore, we characterize the value function returned
by Algorithm 1 using the following proposition.
Proposition 3. The expected reward of the controller re-
turned by Algorithm 1 is the value function obtained by
committing to control strategy µ returned by Algorithm 1.
The advantage of Algorithm 1 is that it significantly
reduces computation and memory cost comparing to global
optimization techniques [34] and discretization-based ap-
proximate algorithms [32]. Global optimization techniques,
for example, spatial branch and bound has been demon-
strated non-efficient comparing to MILP. The approximate
solution proposed in [32] introduces extra binary variables
and constraints, whose sizes are linear to the discretization
resolution. The introduction of extra variables and constraints
weakens its scalability, especially for the large state space in
product SG. In contrast, Algorithm 1 introduces no additional
variables when solving the MILP. Therefore, Algorithm 1
significantly saves memory and model construction time for
commercial solvers. Algorithm 1 does not guarantee that
a global optimal solution will be found. Hence, executing
Algorithm 1 from different initial points can improve the
performance of Algorithm 1.
VI. CASE STUDY
In this section, we present a numerical case study to
demonstrate the proposed approach.
A. Case Study Settings
Suppose a robot is performing tasks modeled in scLTL
in a bounded environment. We consider the robot fol-
lowing standard discrete time model x(t + 1) = x(t) +
(uC(t) + uA(t) + ϑ(t))∆t, where x(t) ⊂ R2 is the location
of the robot at time t, uC(t) ∈ U ⊂ R2 is the control input
from the controller, uA(t) ∈ A ⊂ R3 is the input signal from
the adversary and ϑ(t) ⊂ R2 is the stochastic disturbance,
∆t = tk+1 − tk is the time interval. Therefore, we have
that the control signal of the robot is compromised by the
adversary. Here we let A ⊂ U .
We divide the region into 9 sub-regions with each size
is 1m × 1m. We abstract the stochastic game as follows
[25]. Let each sub-region be a state in the stochastic game.
Hence, the stochastic game has 9 states and we will refer to
state and sub-region interchangeably in the following. Each
state can be mapped to a subset of atomic propositions by
labeling function L as shown in Fig. 1a. The action sets for
the controller and adversary are defined as UC = UA =
{N,S,W,E}, implying moving towards the adjacent sub-
region. When the adversary compromises the control input,
the probability that the robot transits to its intended state is
0.6. Moreover, when the robot is at ECE lab, the adversary
can block all the transitions of the robot (e.g., close the door
of the room).
Suppose the robot is given 4 specifications Φ =
{φ1, φ2, φ3, φ4} as shown in Table I. The robot is required to
visit the CPS lab or ECE lab before visiting classroom.
Moreover, they are required to be visited in this particular
order if possible. In the meantime, the robot should avoid
obstacle during the visit to guarantee safety property. Finally,
the robot is required to eventually visit ECE lounge once
it has visited CPS lab.
formula r(φi)
G¬obstacle ∧ F (CPS lab ∧ (FECE lab ∧ Fclassroom)) 50
G¬obstacle ∧ F (CPS lab ∧ Fclassroom) 20
G¬obstacle ∧ F (ECE lab ∧ Fclassroom) 20
CPS lab =⇒ FECE lounge 10
TABLE I: Specifications given to the robot. The specifica-
tions are indexed from φ1 to φ4 from top to bottom.
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Fig. 1: Fig. 1a shows the comparison of the trajectories. The trajectory in solid line is generated using the proposed approach.
The trajectory in dotted line is generated without considering the presence of adversary. Fig. 1b shows the comparison of
expected rewards obtained using different approaches. The blue bars are generated using the proposed approach. The yellow
bars are generated without considering the presence of adversary. Fig. 1c shows the relationship between controller’s expected
reward and anchoring bias parameter.
B. Case Study Results
Let the upper left state in Fig. 1a be the initial state.
Fig. 1a shows two trajectories generated using the proposed
approach and the control policy synthesized without con-
sidering the presence of the adversary. Without considering
the adversary, the control policy attempts to satisfy all
the specifications in Φ. However, the adversary is capable
to block all the transitions at state marked as ECE lab.
Therefore, following this policy can only satisfy specification
φ4. Our proposed approach takes the potential impacts from
the adversary into consideration. By using the proposed
approach, specifications φ2 and φ4 are satisfied. Hence,
the robot can obtain higher reward by using the proposed
approach. The increment of the robot’s expected reward
achieved using our proposed approach is shown in Fig. 1b.
In Fig. 1c, we investigate the relationship between ob-
servation capability of the adversary and expected reward
of the controller. We vary α in (1) from 0 to 1. When
α = 0, the adversary has unlimited observation capability
and it has perfect knowledge of the controller’s strategy.
When α = 1, the adversary makes no observation over
the controller’s strategy and it assumes the adversary plays
uniform strategy. From Fig. 1c, we observe that the expected
reward of the controller increases with respect to the reduc-
tion of adversary’s observation capability. Hence the more
observations the adversary makes, the lower expected reward
the controller obtains.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have investigated minimum violation
problem on stochastic system in the presence of an adversary.
The system is given a set of specifications modeled in scLTL.
We model the interaction between the controller and adver-
sary using a stochastic Stackelberg game. Moreover, to model
the behavior of human adversaries, we consider anchoring
bias. We rely on the concept of Stackelberg equilibrium to
synthesize a control strategy. An efficient heristic algorithm
is proposed to compute the control policy. We show the
proposed algorithm converges in finite time and demonstrate
the proposed approach using a numerical case study.
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